torical figures such as Husserl and Heidegger loom large in Joseph Lyons' thoughts, but others such as Sartre, Buber, Straus, Binswanger and Kierkegaard are acknowledged as influential in the evolution of modern phenomenology.
Lyons contrasts 'a science of Others', psychology to-day, with the need for 'a phenomenological orientation wherein the person is the target and psychology is defined as "the science of persons as they are apprehended by Other persons". He again raises the cry of "existentialism; can we be sure we are seeing a patient as he really is or are we seeing merely a projection of our own theories about him?", Lyons in examining phenomenology and the unconscious states "the degree to which the dient's view of the matter is ignored and the therapist's view proclaimed and endlessly discussed, might even make one suspect that the unconscious, in our contemporary clinical science, does not refer to the inward workings of the client but to the outward extensions of the therapist". The author then proceeds to a historical review of what constitutes science, paying particular attention to the Person as he appears in science and psychology. The plea seems to be for a phenomenological humanism to counteract empirical dehumanization. Such a science of phenomenology would truly concern itself with a transactional model in which the observer would observe himself and would act as a full human being while observing the other person, the patient, as a real 'Person' and not an impersonal 'Other' or as a special kind of object.
Of the many areas in the clinical field that Joseph Lyons deals with, one of the more interesting is his treatment of the case of Gregor. This is the clinical encounter where four examiners, during ten sessions, administered twenty~seven tests to one hapless patient. The plea here, as throughout phenomenology, is to understand the person and not to perceive the patient as "a collection of evidence in re-°E xistence. May R., Angel, E. Ellenberger H. F. New York, Basic Books, 1958. gard to a predetermined theory, not the target for our techniques but the living source of our method".
If Joseph Lyons set out to provide a theo~e~ical fou~dation for psychology or clinical practIce he fell far short of his goal. On the other hand if Dr. Lyons set out to raise questions in our mind, to stimulate our interest and add to our understanding of phenomenology and the existantial frame of reference, then he has in large measure succeeded in his endeavour.
H. KLONOFF Whatever our beliefs may be about what goes on inside a man's head, we do know that information from the outside world enters it through the sense organs and comes out as voluntary muscle movement. The brain transforms input information to output action, and the psychiatrist is trying to identify and orrect faults in a complex data processmg system. Communication engineers for the last hundred years have been faced with a similar problem. They put information into long cables, land lines and radio links, and watched it come out at the other end in reduced, contaminated, and distorted forms. In 1924 Nyquist published Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed, containing the first mathematical basis for a formal theory of information. He showed that the amount of information which could be transmitted through a channel is limited by the frequency range of the channel -a high. fi set i~capable of transmitting more information than a pocket transister radio. He also showed that much of the transmitted signal contains no real information, it tells the recipient nothing he does not know already. It is redundant.
Hartley, in 1928, demonstrated that the sender and receiver must have a common code, that the sender selects items from this code, and that the amount of information in a symbol varies with the logarithm of the number of symbols in the code.
With World War II, and the development of more complex radar and communication systems, it became vital to extract the wanted signals from unwanted interfering signals and from noise. Kolmogoroff in Russia and Wiener in the U.S. showed the mathematical basis for such extraction. In 1948 Shannon published a comprehensive and formal Theory of Information, which was applied immediately and shown to be of the greatest practical importance. Thus Information and Communication Theory are not esoteric concepts of the mathematicians, but practical tools developed by men who had to find out how to deal with 'sick' communication networks.
Within two years Hick showed how the new theory could be applied to man in very specific situations -such as pressing a switch from among a group of switches when a certain light comes on. The man behaves like a communication channel. The time he takes to decide which switch to press increases as the logarithm of the amount of selective information in the signal, that is, the number of switches he has to choose from.
It is very tempting to transfer fruitful mathematical theories from the exploding physical sciences to the more pedestrian, and more complex, biological sciences. Unfortunately the rigorous definitions involved are not always realized by the enthusiastic biologists. 'Information' to a communications engineer means selective information, a "yes" or "no" answer to a question selected from a strictly deliminated group of questions. The psychiatrist thinks of something much broader, his main interest is in semantic information.
In{ormLltion Storage and N eural Control is a valuable attempt to examine the uses of Information Theory in the biological sciences, in terms of both its present restrictions and its possible future expansions. It is a collection of the papers presented at the Tenth Annual Scientific Meeting of the Houston Neurological Society, together with the complete discussions subsequent to each group of papers. The high standard of all the papers reflects the scientific authority of their authors, and much in the volume is new and important. There is a good introductory chapter by Salzberg "What Is Information Theory"? and it is followed by papers discussing how information is presented, and the theory of information processing. Application to biological systems is discussed with detailed reference to the protein molecule, to coding in purine and pyrimidine, to the action of viruses, and to the ecology of plankton. A knowledge of the codes used in molecular systems appears to be basic to the understanding of the mechanisms of memory and inheritance. It is a problem which can only be solved with the help of the mathematical biologist and the communications expert, but it is of fundamental importance to all behavioural scientists.
The paper by Bateson on Exchange of Information about Patterns of Human
Behaviour, together with those on the neurophysiological aspects of information storage and transfer, and on the human nervous system as an information processing system, are of especial interest to the psychiatrist. At the same time they demonstrate how much more difficult are the problems of the mind than those of the body. All these papers are excellent -and advanced.
But I am afraid that Information Theory, like Statistics, is one of those subjects with which all of us will have to become acquainted, if only to know the correct incantations to mutter in reply to the runes of our more sophisticated colleagues. At present, Information Theory and the closely related theories of communication and control, are only useful to the psychiatrist as conceptual frameworks -to be discarded if they do not help him to conceptualise. But they emphasis that one of the major tasks of psychiatry is to discover the relationships between what human beings perceive and what they do, and that everything that comes out of a man is the result, often highly distorted, of something that went in at some time during his life. We may think of the noise and distortion that occur as being the result of a twisted molecule or a twisted psyche but the concept of attempting to develop a 'describing function' for behaviour is the same.
There is another reason. Information Theory is the essence of the language that the machines use for communication.
Since the first electronic computer went into action about a dozen years ago, a number of the simpler human capabilities have been imitated. The methods of problem-solving and so on used by man, may be quite different from those used by the computer but the input-output relationships can appear the same. If you can only read the tapes going into and emerging from a black box, you can only guess whether the box contains digital circuitry -or a man with a sliderule. Disorders of computer reasoning, especially in the second-generation adaptive computers, may suggest possible mechanisms in man. The enthusiasm and successes of the computer engineers reflect the advantages of a field where you design your systems and are not restricted to investigation and repair. It also reflects the billions of dollars poured into it. If the less fortunate behavioural scientists are to profit from the findings of their computer colleagues, they will have to learn something of their jargon.
The chief danger of the present volume is that it may dishearten the enquiring psychiatrist, who is usually aware of his mathematical weaknesses, to reject the whole subject as being too complicated for him to grapple with in his restricted reading time. The last chapter could be omitted as it is completely non-scientific and is just concerned with lay people describing their experience under LSD, which really adds nothing to the scientific understanding of the use of these drugs. On the whole, the most interesting study appears to be the work of Bradley and Key who state that, both from the electophysiological and conditioning experiments with LSD, the drug has a site of
